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Taxation of Carried Interests: The Reform That Did
Not Happen*
Howard E. Abrams**
Congress soon may revise the taxation of partnerships and their
partners to treat as compensation income the returns to partners who
contribute services to their venture. Under current law, the taxation of
partnership income is determined not by reference to what the partners
contribute to the venture but rather to the manner in which the
partnership earns its profit.' So, for example, if a partnership purchases
capital assets and holds them for more than one year, any gain or loss
then realized from the sale or exchange of those assets is includible by
the partners as long-term capital gain. 2 Similarly, inventory of the
partnership is defined by reference to the business of the partnership
(rather than to the businesses of its partners), and expenditures will be
classified as "start-up costs" if the partnership enters a new trade or
business even if one, two, or even all of its partners have actively
3
conducted that trade or business for many years.
The congressional interest in this technical nuance of partnership tax
law flows directly from an article recently published by Professor Victor
Fleischer. 4 Professor Fleischer's contribution to the literature does not
rest on his recognition of this issue nor on his proposed revisions to the
Internal Revenue Code; many have come before, with essentially the
same arguments leading to the same proposed solutions. 5 Rather, what
*

Copyright 2008 by Howard E. Abrams.

Professor, Emory Law School; Maurice R. Greenberg Visiting Professor, Yale Law
School.
1. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(b) (as amended in 2005).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(1) (2005).
3. E.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521 (1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 512
(5th Cir. 1980).
4. Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing PartnershipProfits in Private Equity Funds, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008).
5. E.g., Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating Service Partners,48 TAX L.
REV. 69 (1992) (hereinafter "Reforming Subchapter K"). On the taxation of service partners, see
Michael L. Schler, Taxing PartnershipProfits as Compensation Income, 119 TA NOTES 829
(2008); Sarah Pendergraft, From Human Capital to Capital Gains: The Puzzle of Profits
Interests,27 VA. TAX REV. 709 (2008); David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of CarriedInterests in
Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715 (2008); Taxing Private Equity CarriedInterest Using an
**
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put Professor Fleischer on the map was a new contextualization of the
carried interest issue: hedge funds and private equity investors operate

as partnerships having billions of dollars under management, and the
returns to the managing partners of these extraordinarily wealthy
organizations have bordered on the astronomical. Thus, the scale of the
carried interest issue has ratcheted up significantly, and that has shifted
arguments from the technical to the fundamental: hedge fund and

private equity managers make too much money, and it pours salt in the
wounds when their tax rate is lower than everyone else's. 6 Or so the
7
argument goes.
I attempt in the pages that follow to address both the political and
technical arguments raised in support of changing the taxation of carried
interests. I conclude that (1) the current manner of taxing carried

interests is more consistent with general principles of taxation than is
admitted by its critics, and (2) changing the taxation of carried interests
as suggested by its critics is far more difficult than claimed. As a result,
I conclude that the statutory treatment of carried interests ought not be
changed-which should not be understood as supporting the current
system of taxation of the very wealthy. Those who annually are paid

Incentive Stock Option Analogy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 846 (2008); Howard E. Abrams, A Close
Look at the CarriedInterest Legislation, 117 TAX NOTES 961 (2007) (hereinafter "Close Look");
Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of CarriedInterests, 116 TAX NOTES 183 (2007), reprinted in 23
TAX MGMT. REAL EST. J. 199 (2007); Lee A. Sheppard, The Unbearable Lightness of the Carried
Interest Bill, 116 TAX NOTES 15 (2007); Thomas I. Hausman, Planning for Receipt of a
Partnership Compensatory Interest, 114 TAX NOTES 529 (2007); N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N TAX
SECTION, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS AND REVENUE PROCEDURE RELATING TO
PARTNERSHIP EQUITY TRANSFERRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES,
(2005),
available
at
http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/
TaxReports/l098rpt.pdf; Leo L. Schmolka, Taxing PartnershipInterests Exchangedfor Services:
Let Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 TAX L. REV. 287 (1992); Laura E. Cunningham, Taxing
PartnershipInterests Exchangedfor Services, 47 TAX L. REV. 247, 252 (1992); Mark P. Gergen,
Pooling or Exchange: The Taxation of Joint Ventures Between Labor and Capital, 44 TAX L.
REV. 519 (1989); Barksdale Hortenstine & Thomas W. Ford, Jr., Receipt of a PartnershipInterest
for Services: A Controversy That Will Not Die, 65 TAXES 880 (1987); Sheldon I. Banoff,
Conversions of Services into Property Interests: Choice of Form of Business, 61 TAXES 844
(1983); Martin B. Cowan, Receipt of an Interest in Partnership Profits in Considerationfor
Services: The Diamond Case, 27 TAX L. REV. 161 (1972).
6. E.g., Jenny Anderson & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Op-Ed., Tax Gap Puts Private Equity Firms
on the Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2007, at CI; Taxing Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, April 2,
2007, at A22.
7. One often heard quip was: "[i]t offends our values as a nation when an investment manager
making $50 million can pay a lower tax rate on her earned income than a teacher making $50,000
pays on her income." Kevin Drawbaugh, Hillary Clinton Slams Private Equity Tax Rate,
BOSTON.COM, Jul. 13, 2007, http://www.boston.comlnews/nation/articles/2007/07/14/hillaryclintonslams-privateequity-tax rate/.
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$10 million or $100 million to do interesting work in an air conditioned
office should pay more than we currently demand, even if that income
arises from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. There are many
ways to increase the taxation of our wealthiest citizens; 8 my point is that
changing the statutory taxation of carried interests is not the way to do
it.

I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE TAXATION

OF PARTNERSHIPS AND THEIR

PARTNERS

A partnership is not a taxable entity. 9 However, it computes its
federal income taxes as if it were a taxable entity, 10 and then the entitylevel items of income, deduction, and credit are passed through to and
reported by the partners."1 Each partner's share of the entity's taxable
items is called the partner's "distributive share." 12 Each partner must
report her distributive share even if there are no distributions made by
the partnership in the current taxable year. 13 The characterization of
each tax item (such as capital gain versus ordinary income or foreign
at the entity-level by
versus domestic source income) is determined
14
reference to the partnership's activities.
Because the partnership's activities are taxable to the partners as the
activities occur, they are not taxable again when distributions are made;
that is, as a general rule, distributions from a partnership to a partner are
treated as a tax-free return of basis. 15 The partner's entire adjusted basis
in her partnership interest (usually called her "outside basis") 16 is
available to offset the distribution; there is no basis allocation similar to
8. For example, the capital gain preference could be abolished as it was under the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, it could be limited or phased out based on a taxpayer's net capital gain includible in
each taxable year (similar to the operation of Section 179 applicable to expensing in lieu of
depreciation, see I.R.C. § 179(b)(2) (2000 & West 2008), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-185 §
102(a)), it could be limited based on the amount of a taxpayer's gross income, net income or
adjusted gross income (similar to the child care credit, see I.R.C. § 24(b)(1) (2000 & West 2008)),
or it could be capped at a fixed amount without regard to a taxpayer's other income or deductions
(such as the exclusion for gain from the sale of a principal residence, see I.R.C. § 121(b) (2000 &
West 2008)).
9. I.R.C. § 701 (2000 & West 2008).
10. See I.R.C. § 703 (2000).
11. I.R.C. § 702 (2000 & West 2008).
12. See I.R.C. §§ 702(a), 704 (2000 & West 2008) (discussing partner's distributive share).
13. I.R.C. § 702; United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 457 (1973).
14. See Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(b) (as amended in 2005) (discussing items constituting
distributive shares).
15. See I.R.C. § 731(a) (2000 & West 2008). I am ignoring the anti-abuse provisions in I.R.C.
§§ 707(a)(2)(B) (2000) (disguised sale), 704(c)(1)(B) (2000) (distribution of contributed
property), and 737 (2000) (distribution to partner who contributed appreciated property).

16. I.R.C.

§ 731(a)(1).
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that applied in the corporate context. Further, if the distribution consists
of property rather than of cash, there is no income recognition even if
the value of the distributed property exceeds the distributee partner's
outside basis.17 The paradigm on which partnership taxation is based is
entity transparency: the partnership is not a taxable entity and,
18
generally, transactions between the entity and its owners are tax-free.
Instead, taxation is imposed when the entity or its partners deal with
third parties. 19
A partner's outside basis starts at the amount of cash and the adjusted
basis of property contributed to the venture by the partner. 20 It is
increased for distributive share of income and reduced for distributive
share of loss. 2 1 Additional contributions increase outside basis and
distributions decrease outside basis, 2 2 generally by the amount of cash
and the adjusted basis of property distributed. Further, each partner
increases outside basis for any increase (and decreases outside basis for
any reduction) in share of the partnership's borrowings. Thus, a
partner's outside basis generally reflects the partner's after-tax
23
investment (both debt and equity) in the venture.
The determination of each partner's distributive share is determined
by reference to the partnership agreement so long as each allocation as
specified in the partnership agreement has "substantial economic
effect." 24 In general, this requires that allocations must be consistent
with the underlying economic arrangements of the partners25 and must
affect the dollar amounts to be received by the partners from the
partnership independent of tax consequences. 26
With limited
exceptions, the requirement of economic effect is satisfied by
maintaining capital accounts for each partner and then using final
27
capital account balances to determine liquidating distributions.
17.
18.

Id.
See generally Howard E. Abrams, The Section 734(b) Basis Adjustment Needs Repair, 57

TAX LAW. 343, 343-44 (2004).

19. In its dealings with third-parties, a partnership is treated like any other taxpayer. United
States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441 (1973).
20. See I.R.C. § 722 (2000 & West 2008).
21. See I.R.C. § 705 (2000).
22. See I.R.C. § 733 (2000) (discussing basis of distributee partner's interest).
23. See William D. Andrews, Inside Basis Adjustments and Hot Asset Exchanges in
PartnershipDistributions,47 TAX L. REV. 3, 10 (1991).
24. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (2000).
25. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2008) (requirement of economic
effect).
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a) (requirement that economic effect be substantial).
27. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(l) (general test for economic effect), 1.7041(b)(2)(d) (alternate test for economic effect).
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Capital account maintenance is specified in detailed treasury
regulations 28 intended to ensure that each partner's 29capital account
reflects the partner's economic share in the partnership.
The requirement of economic effect imposes a significant limitation
on a partnership's ability to allocate losses of the venture among the
partners. In general, no allocation of loss can drive a partner's capital
account more negative than the maximum amount that the partner can
be required to restore to the partnership upon liquidation of the partner's
interest in the venture. 30 As a result, partnership losses cannot be
allocated to a partner in excess of a partner's net after-tax equity
investment in the venture, unless the partner is willing to incur a1
3
potential obligation to contribute additional funds to the partnership;
such an obligation, if it exists, is called a "deficit restoration obligation"
(or a "DRO").
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF CARRIED INTERESTS
The term "carried interest" is not defined in the Internal Revenue
Code or in the Income Tax Regulations. Rather, it is a jargon term that
has come to stand for a distributive share of partnership profits in excess
of the partner's relative capital contribution. Often, but not always,
distributions on a carried interest are deferred until contributed capital
has been repaid, sometimes with an interest-like return as well (usually
called a "hurdle"). To understand the issues that surround the taxation
of carried interests, it is important to appreciate the precise ways in
which a carried interest can be specified.
As described above, a partner's share of the economics of the
partnership is defined by the partner's capital account: the greater a
partner's capital account balance, the more value that eventually must
be distributed to the partner. When we speak of the manner in which a
partner's interest is funded, we are describing the transactions that
increase the partner's capital account. A carried interest can be funded
in at least three different ways.
First, a carried interest can be funded out of the partnership's gross
income, usually called a gross income allocation. For example, a
partnership agreement might provide that S will be allocated 10% of the
gross income of the venture. Such a funding mechanism divorces S's
28.
29.
30.
3 1.
1.704-

See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv).
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a).
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(d)(2).
For what constitutes an obligation to contribute funds to the venture, see Treas. Reg. §
1(b)(2)(c).
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interest from that of the other partners because S becomes indifferent to
the partnership costs and other expenditures. To be sure, if the
partnership has no gross income, then S will be allocated nothing, and
so a gross income allocation is dependent on the activities of the venture
in a way that usual forms of compensation are not. Nonetheless, a gross
income allocation is not in any sense an entrepreneurial return from the
venture and so ought to be treated as compensation to the partner.
Despite an initial misstep in this area, 32 that is how such carried
interests now are taxed.33
Second, a carried interest might be funded out of annual net profit but
without regard to profit or loss in other years. This funding mechanism,
like the gross income allocation, really does not reflect an
entrepreneurial return because one's yearly profit is at most a fair
substitute for long-term gain or loss.
Third, a carried interest could be funded out of overall income, taking
into account all aspects of the partnership's venture. So, for example, if
the partnership has an aggregate net profit of $30,000, then S will be
allocated 10% of that amount, or $3,000. It turns out to be surprisingly
hard to craft such a funding mechanism.
Consider the following example. R contributes cash of $100,000 to
the RS partnership while S contributes nothing but services. 34 The
partnership agreement provides that S will receive a carried interest of
10% of net profits. Assume that formation of the partnership is a taxfree event and that the partnership invests half of its cash in each of two
investments: investment #1 and investment #2. Also assume that S
manages the investments in exchange for the carried interest. Finally,
assume that the partnership is formed in year 0, that investment #1 is
sold in year 1 for $80,000, that investment #2 is sold in year 2 for
$50,000, and that the partnership then liquidates. We get (where "CA"
is the capital account and "OB" is the outside basis):

32. See Pratt v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 203 (1975), affd in part, rev'd in part, 550 F.2d 1023
(5th Cir. 1977).
33. Rev. Rul. 81-300, 1982-2 C.B. 143 (payment based on gross rentals can be treated as a
"guaranteed payment" under Section 707(c)). Congress has indicated that such gross income
allocation received in exchange for services should be taxed under Section 707(a)(1) as
compensation paid to a partner other than in his capacity as a partner. See S. PRT. No. 169, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 226 (Comm. Print 1984).
34. See Howard E. Abrams, Using Cash and CarriedInterests in a Real Estate Partnership,
31 REAL EST. TAx'N 52 (1st Quarter 2004), reprintedin 20 TAX MGMT. REAL EST. J. 329 (2004).
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Figure 1
S
CA

R
CA
$ 100,000
27,000
0
$ 127,000

OB
$100,000
27,000
0
$ 127,000

$

0

$

$

3,000
0
3,000

$

OB

0 Formation
3,000 Sale of investment #1
0 Sale of investment #2
3,000 Ending totals

As these final capital balances in Figure 1 show, the partnership's
cash of $130,000 will be distributed $127,000 to R and $3,000 to S,
reflecting their 90/10 sharing ratio. In year 1, there was a partnershiplevel gain of $30,000, allocated $27,000 to R and $3,000 to S. None of
the available cash of $80,000 was distributed in year 1, but that does not
preclude immediate taxation in the year of sale. As described above,
partners are taxed on the partnership's income without regard to
whether that income is distributed in the current year. Thus, R and S
have a tax burden from their distributive shares even though neither
received any funds with which to pay their tax obligations. While there
is nothing intrinsically wrong with such a result, few taxpayers relish
the prospect of paying tax now but receiving cash later. So suppose that
the partnership agreement also requires that available cash be
distributed each year and that R's contributed capital be distributed
before any distributions are made to S. In that case, the books would
have been:
Figure 2
R
S
CA
OB
CA
OB
$ 100,000
$ 100,000
$
0 $
0 Formation
27,000
27,000
3,000
3,000 Sale of investment #1
( 80,000) ( 80,000)
0
0 Year 1 distribution
0
0
0
0 Sale of investment #2
$ 47,000 $ 47,000 $ 3,000 $ 3,000 Liquidating totals
These totals in Figure 2 continue to reflect the 90/10 sharing ratio of
the partners; the only change is that a portion of R's return ($80,000) is
received in year 1 and a portion ($47,000) in year 2. R now has plenty
of cash with which to pay the tax liability incurred in year 1, but S
continues to face the problem described above: no immediate cash
despite the immediate tax obligation.
Suppose, then, that the
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partnership had distributed its available cash first as income was
allocated and then as a return of capital. In that case, the books would
have been:
Figure 3
R
S
CA
OB
CA
OB
$ 100,000 $ 100,000
$
0 $
0 Formation
27,000
27,000
3,000 Sale of investment #1
3,000
27,000) (27,000)
(
3,000) (
3,000) Profit distribution
50,000) (50,000)
0
0 Capital distribution
0
0
0
0 Sale of investment #2
$ 50,000 $ 50,000 $
0 Liquidating totals
0 $
As shown in Figure 3, each partner is distributed in year 1 cash equal
to distributive share of gain, and this ensures that no partner faces the
problem of a tax liability without equivalent cash. The overall sharing
ratio remains unchanged at 90/10; the only difference now is that each
partner has received cash in year 1. In fact, partner S receives all of her
share of cash in year 1 rather than in year 2.
Suppose, though, that investment #2 had been sold in year 2 not for
the $50,000 that it had cost the partnership, but instead for only
$30,000; that is, suppose it were sold at a $20,000 loss. Now, over the
life of the partnership there is gain of only $10,000: the profit in year 1
was partially offset by the loss in year 2. If S's carried interest is to
reflect a true entrepreneurial return, then S's net share should be 10% of
$10,000, or $1,000. Since S was allocated $3,000 of income in year 1,
S must be allocated $2,000 of loss in year 2. Thus, the books would be:
Figure 4
R
S
CA
OB
CA
OB
$ 100,000 $ 100,000 $
0 $
0 Formation
27,000
27,000
3,000
3,000 Sale of investment #1
27,000) ( 27,000) (
3,000) (
3,000) Profit distribution
50,000) ( 50,000)
0
0 Capital distribution
18,000) ( 18,000) (
2,000) Sale of investment #2
2,000) (
$ 32,000
$ 32,000 ($ 2,000) ($ 2,000) Liquidating totals
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The totals in Figure 4 show that S must now repay $2,000 to the
venture for distribution to R, a repayment that partially offsets the year
1 distribution to S. But if S has not agreed to a deficit restoration
obligation, this repayment cannot be demanded. Indeed, if S has no
deficit restoration obligation, the loss allocation to S is improper and so
the books of the partnership actually will be:
Figure 5
R
S
CA
OB
CA
OB
$ 100,000 $ 100,000 $
0 $
0 Formation
27,000
27,000
3,000
3,000 Sale of investment #1
( 27,000) ( 27,000) (
3,000) (
3,000) Profit distribution
( 50,000) ( 50,000)
0
0 Capital distribution
( 20,000) ( 20,000)
0
0 Sale of investment #2
$ 30,000
$ 30,000
$
0 $
0 Liquidating totals
As shown in Figure 5, though, the economics of the venture have
been distorted: the partnership has turned a profit of $10,000, and of that
amount S has been allocated $3,000, or fully 30%. As these examples
make clear and is well known by tax advisors, there simply is no way to
ensure that S receives exactly the agreed upon carried interest return
without creating phantom income in the early years, risking a claw-back
obligation in the later years, or some combination of both. In practice,
we often see early distributions made to the owner of a carried interest
in an amount sufficient to cover the anticipated tax liability but no more
(usually called a "tax distribution"); this distribution creates the risk of
either (a) a claw-back obligation to the holder of the carried interest or
(b) excess loss allocated to the other partners. Whether the partnership
agreement ultimately includes (a), (b), or some combination of the two
is a business decision for the partners to resolve before the venture
starts.

III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TAXATION

35
OF SERVICE PARTNERS

In the absence of a non-recognition provision, the transfer of property
or services to a partnership in exchange for an interest in the venture
would be a taxable event. 36 However, since Subchapter K was first
35.

The discussion in this section is taken in part from RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, HOWARD E.

ABRAMS & DON A. LEATHERMAN,

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND

PARTNERSHIPS (forthcoming 4th ed. 2009).
36. See I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c) (2000).
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added to the Code in 1954, 37 Section 721 has provided that "[n]o gain
or loss shall be recognized to a partnership or to any of its partners in
the case of a contribution of property to the partnership in exchange for
an interest in the partnership." 3 8 It is far from clear whether this
provision should apply to a transferor of services: courts have looked to
Section 351 when interpreting Section 721, 39 and the teaching of
Section 351 plainly cuts in favor of non-recognition.
To be sure, the contribution of services to a corporation is not
described in Section 351, but that is because Section 351(d)(1)
40
specifically excludes services from the definition of "property."
There is, though, no partnership provision equivalent to Section
351(d)(1). Accordingly, unless Section 351(d)(1) is redundant, the
correspondence of Sections 721(a) and 351(a) along with the lack of a
Subchapter K provision corresponding to Section 351(d)(1) strongly
41
suggests that Section 721(a) applies to the contribution of services.
Further, Section 721(a) also protects the partnership from recognition on
the transaction, and the corresponding provision in Subchapter C,
Section 1032(a), applies to contributions of "property," which in this
42
context includes services.
Nevertheless, the regulation promulgated under Section 721 has long
provided that the contribution of services in exchange for a partnership
interest is a taxable transaction, at least in some circumstances.
Cryptically, the regulation provides:
To the extent that any of the partners gives up any part of his right to
be repaid his contributions (as distinguished from a share in
partnership profits) in favor of another partner as compensation for
services ... section 721 does not apply. The value of an interest in
such partnership capital so transferred to a partner as compensation for
services constitutes income to the partner under section 61.

37. On the history of the partnership provisions, see J. Paul Jackson, Mark H. Johnson,
Stanley S. Surrey, Carolyn K. Tenen & William C. Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
Partnerships,54 COLUM. L. REv. 1183, 1183-84 (1954).
38. I.R.C. § 721(a) (2000).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Stafford, 727 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir. 1984) (discussing
non-recognition of limited partnership interest).
40. I.R.C. § 351 (2000 & West 2008).
41. That is, Section 351(a) does not apply to services because Section 351(d)(l) says so; in the

absence of Section 351(d)(1), presumably Section 351(a) would apply to services. So, since
Section 721 uses the same language as Section 351(a) and because Subchapter K has no provision
equivalent to Section 351(d)(1), Section 721 should apply to services.

42. Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-1 (a) (as amended in 2008).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (as amended in 2005) (emphasis added).
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If a partner contributes services in exchange for a share of the capital
and profits of the partnership, we say that the service partner has
received a "capital" interest. The quoted regulation unquestionably
provides that receipt of such a capital interest by a service partner is
taxable to the partner, a result with which the courts have agreed. 44 But
by implication, this regulation seems to say that if the service partner
receives only a share of future profits (a "profits interest"), then the
45
event is tax-free.
46
Or so everyone thought until 1971. In Diamond v. Commissioner,
the Tax Court held that the contribution of services to a partnership in
exchange for a mere profits interest is taxable to the service partner, a
result affirmed on appeal. Indeed, the appellate court recognized the
"startling degree of unanimity" by the commentators in opposition to
the Tax Court's result in Diamond4 7 as well as a legislative history that
was "equivocal. 48 But in the absence of regulations speaking directly
to the issue, the Circuit Court thought "it sound policy to defer to the
49
expertise of the Commissioner and the Judges of the Tax Court."
So the fight shifted from the theoretical to the practical. Because the
value of a profits interest depends on the future success of the
partnership's business venture, determining that value when the
partnership interest is created often will be difficult. Taxpayers have
argued for low, or even zero, initial values with surprising success.50 In
response to the practical difficulties in valuing a profits interest, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) promulgated an administrative rule that
relinquished its victory in Diamond in most circumstances. 5 1 In
Revenue Procedure 93-27, the IRS provided the general rule that
if a person receives a profits interest for the provision of services to or
for the benefit of a partnership in a partner capacity or in anticipation
of being a partner, the Internal Revenue Service will not treat the
44. United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487, 489 (5th Cir. 1964). See also McDougal v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720, 727 (1974).
45. Hale v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1965-274, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1497, 1502 n.3 (1965).
46. Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), affd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974);
accord Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
47. Diamond, 492 F.2d at 289.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 291. In addition, a never-finalized proposed regulation provides that Section 83
applies to receipt of a partnership interest in connection with the performance of services. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.721-l(b)(1)(i), 36 Fed. Reg. 10787, 10799 (June 3, 1971).
50. See, e.g., Campbell, 943 F.2d at 815; St. John v. United States, No. 82-1134, 1983 WL
1715 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1983); Kenroy, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-232, 47 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1749 (1984); see also Pacheco v. United States, 912 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1990); Nat'l Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-596, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1223 (1986).
51. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
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receipt of such
an interest as a taxable event for the partner or the
52
partnership.
However, this rule does not apply:
(1) If the profits interest relates to a substantially certain and
predictable stream of income from partnership assets, such as income
from high-quality debt securities or a high-quality net lease;
(2) If within two years of receipt, the partner disposes of the profits
interest; or
(3) If the profits interest is a limited partnership interest in a "publicly
traded partnership" within
the meaning of section 7704(b) of the
53
Internal Revenue Code.
In Revenue Procedure 2001-43, 54 the IRS clarified that the rule of
Revenue Procedure 93-27 applies whether or not the profits interest is
vested when received and that, if the interest initially is unvested, the
vesting of the interest is not itself a taxable event. Thus, Revenue
Procedure 2001-43 made clear that the rules of Section 83 do not apply
to the contribution of services to a partnership in exchange for a profits
interest other than in the three narrow exceptional fact patterns
identified in Revenue Procedure 93-27. However, neither Revenue
Procedure actually mentions Section 83.
Section 83, enacted largely to rationalize the taxation of restricted
stock provided to a corporation in exchange for services, 55 applies
broadly whenever property is received "in connection with the
performance of services."56 And while neither Revenue Procedure 9327 nor Revenue Procedure 2001-43 mentions Section 83, proposed
regulations have since been promulgated that apply the rules of Section
83 to a partnership interest received in connection with the performance
of services. 5 7 In general, Section 83(a) provides that the excess of the
fair market value of property over the price paid by the service provider
is includible in the service provider's gross income when the property
first becomes vested, where vested means no longer subject to a

52. Rev.Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
53. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
54. Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191.
55. See Martin W. Helpern, The Unexpected Impact of New Section 83 - The Restricted
Property Provisions, 24 TAX LAW. 365, 365-66 (1971); Note, Deferred Compensation Under
Section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code: Is Restricted Properly Still a Viable Means of
Compensation, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1202, 1202-04 (1972).
56. I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000 & West Supp. 2008). Note thislanguage is broader than "in
exchange for" property.
57. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.83-3(e), 70 Fed. Reg. 50971, 50971 (Aug. 29, 2005), 1.721-I(b)(1),
36 Fed. Reg. 10799, 10799 (June 3, 1971).
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substantial risk of forfeiture. 5 8 In this context, a "substantial risk of
forfeiture" includes a requirement that services be provided in the
future. 59 Thus, a service partner who must perform future services can
defer recognition of income that would otherwise be includible
immediately under Diamond.
There is, though, a cost for this deferral: when the partnership interest
becomes transferable or is no longer conditioned on the performance of
future services, the service partner must include the then-current fair
market value of the interest as ordinary income. 60 Thus, if the
partnership interest appreciates, the entire appreciation eventually will
be taxed as ordinary income.
Under the proposed regulation, property covered by Section 83(a) is
not treated as transferred until the recipient is taxed. 6 1 Thus, while the
interest remains unvested, the service partner cannot be treated as a
partner unless the service partner owns an additional partnership
interest. That means, in particular, that no allocations of partnershiplevel items can be made to the service partner with respect to the
unvested interest. Once the interest vests, the service partner will be
taxed.6 2 Under the proposed regulation, the partnership is entitled to a
deduction if payment to the service partner would have been deductible
under Section 162 or Section 212,63 and the service partner is treated as
contributing property to the partnership equal to the amount of income
64
includible under Section 83(a).
But this result can be avoided if the service partner files an election
under Section 83(b) within thirty days of receiving the interest. 6 5 If
such an election is filed, the service partner must immediately recognize
as ordinary income the excess of the value of the partnership interest
over the amount (if any) paid for the interest. 66 For determining the

58. I.R.C. § 83(a).
59. I.R.C. § 83(c)(1) (2000 & West Supp. 2008).
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2003).
61. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.761 -1(b), 70 Fed. Reg. 29683, 29683 (May 24, 2005); see generally
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1 (a)(1) (stating that property must become substantially vested in the recipient
before becoming taxable). On the application of Section 83 to carried interests, see generally
Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests, 116 TAX NoTEs 183 (2007) (considering
changes to the taxation of partnership carried interest), reprinted in 23 TAX MGMT. REAL EST. J.
199 (2007).
62. I.R.C. § 83(a).
63. I.R.C. § 83(h) (2000 & West Supp. 2008).
64. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(1), 70 Fed. Reg. 29675, 29681 (June 13, 2005).
65. I.R.C. § 83(b)(2) (2000 & West Supp. 2008).
66. I.R.C. § 83(b)(1) (2000 & West Supp. 2008).
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value of the interest, any risk of forfeiture is ignored.6 7 If a partner files
an election under Section 83(b) with respect to an unvested partnership
interest received in connection with the contribution of services and the
interest is subsequently forfeited, the service partner is not entitled to a
68
deduction despite the prior inclusion.
In sum: (1) in Diamond, the government won the legal argument that
receipt of a profits interest is a taxable event; 69 (2) having established in
Diamond that receipt of a profits interest is taxable to the service
partner, twenty years later the government reversed course and provided
by administrative fiat that receipt of a profits interest generally will not
be taxable; 70 and (3) roughly fifteen years after that, the government
proposed regulations that seemingly reject the prior administrative
regime in favor of taxation under Section 83, 7 1 a result consistent with
Diamond but inconsistent with the Revenue Procedures. Unsatisfied
with a mere 180 degree shift in policy, these newly-promulgated
proposed regulations go 180 degrees more by allowing a service partner
and the partnership to elect into a system of taxation much like that
described in the Revenue Procedures. 7 2 If a service partner receives a
vested interest, receives an unvested interest and files an election under
Section 83(b), or receives an unvested interest that eventually vests, the
proposed regulations permit the income recognized by the service
partner under Section 83 to be based on the liquidation value of the
interest. 7 3 Because the liquidation value of a profits interest always is
$0, if the service partner receives only a profits interest and is taxed on
its immediate liquidation value, there is no income to the service
partner. 74 Thus, while the mechanism for allowing a profits interest to
go untaxed will change, the result will not. This election is only
67. I.R.C. § 83(b)(l)(A).
68. I.R.C. § 83(b)(1) (final flush language).
69. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
70. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
71. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.83-3(e), 70 Fed. Reg. 50971, 50971 (Aug. 29, 2005), 1.721-1(b)(1),
36 Fed. Reg. 10799, 10799 (June 3, 1971); see also I.R.S. Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 1221,
availableat http://www.irs.gov/irb/2005-24-IRB/ar1O.htrl.
72. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(1), 70 Fed. Reg. 29680, 29680-81 (May 24, 2005).
73. See I.R.S. Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 1221, available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/200524_IRB/arlO.html.
74. If an unvested interest is received by a service partner and an election is filed by the

service partner under Section 83(b), a subsequent forfeiture of the interest will trigger a set of
"forfeiture" allocations to back-out prior allocations to the service partner. See Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(4)(xii)(c), 70 Fed. Reg. 29675, 29681-82 (June 13, 2005); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7063(b), 70 Fed. Reg. 29682, 29682 (May 24, 2005). Note that the partnership must include in
income any amount deducted upon the grant of the unvested interest if that interest ultimately is
forfeited. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(c) (as amended in 2005).
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disallowed when an interest (a) is an interest in a publicly-traded
partnership, (b) is transferred to the service partner in anticipation of a
subsequent disposition by the service partner, or (c)75 is related to a
substantially certain and predictable stream of income.
IV.

PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE TAXATION OF CARRIED INTERESTS

Professor Fleischer did not propose that Section 83 be applied to the7
7
grant of a profits interest, 7 6 nor did Professor Gergen before him.
Several bills have been introduced in Congress that would increase the
tax burden on service partners who receive a carried interest, but none
of those bills propose taxation under Section 83. As we know, the
courts have held that Section 83 in fact applies to the grant of a profits
interest, 78 but the Treasury and the IRS have determined that such a
system is unworkable. 79 As a result, reform efforts have headed in a
different direction.
Professor Gergen argued more than two decades ago that receipt of a
profits interest should continue to be tax free but that distributive share
on the carried interest, to the extent it is allocable to (a) the partnership's
current earnings or (b) unrealized appreciation in partnership assets, be
treated as compensation without regard to the partnership's activities
that generate the income. 80 Professor Fleischer advocates a similar
regime, albeit one in which partners could elect to report as ordinary
income not their actual distributive share but instead an objective return
8
based on an imputed invested amount of capital. '
On October 25, 2007, Representative Charles B. Rangel (D-NY),
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, introduced a
comprehensive tax reform bill (H.R. 3970) that includes a proposed new
75. See I.R.S. Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 1221, available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/200524_IRB/arl0.html.
76. Fleischer, supra note 4.
77. Reforming Subchapter K, supra note 5.
78. See supra notes 46-49 (discussing Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), aft'd,
492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974)).
79. See supra notes 51-53, 70 (discussing Revenue Procedure 93-27).
80. See generally Reforming Subchapter K, supra note 5. Professor Gergen described his
proposal as "very much like subchapter S," a characterization that he said "decisively answers
any criticism that [the proposal] is too complex for small partnerships." Id. at 105. Sadly, his
proposal bears no resemblance to Subchapter S, or at least to Subchapter S as it applies to S
corporations without a C corporation history. I suspect most taxpayers would find his proposal
extraordinarily complex. See id. at 106-07 (recognizing that under his proposed rule, "it is
necessary to determine whether a profits allocation is a return on capital or services"); see also
infra text accompanying notes 133-41 (discussing the difficulty in separating returns on capital
from returns on services).
81. Fleischer, supra note 4.
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Section 710 of the Internal Revenue Code. 82 This provision also has
been included in the Temporary Tax Relief Act of 2007 (H.R. 3996),
introduced by Chairman Rangel on October 30, 2007.83 Proposed
Section 710 would change the taxation of any "investment services
the most recent legislative response
partnership interest" and represents
84
to the carried interest debate.
The basic thrust of proposed Section 710 follows in broad outline the
proposals of Professors Gergen and Fleischer that distributive share on
carried interests be treated as compensation income to the service
partner. Proposed Section 710 applies only to a partnership investing in
securities, commodities, or real estate and then only to a partner who
provides to the partnership a "substantial quantity" of service consisting
of investment advice, management of assets, or help in arranging
financing. 85 Such a partnership interest is called an "investment
services partnership interest." 86

Under the general rule of proposed Section 710(a)(1), the net income
with respect to an "investment services partnership interest" must be
treated by the partner as ordinary income without regard to the character
of the partnership's activity. 8 7 If, for example, the partnership owns an
apartment complex, then this rule would have little impact on the
partner's distributive share of rental income (because it would be
ordinary income even in the absence of proposed Section 710). But it
82. Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 710 (2007).
83. Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-166, 121 Stat. 2461 (2007).
84. See also H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced June 22, 2007, by Rep. Sander Levin
(D-MI)); H.R. 2785, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced June 20, 2007, by Rep. Peter Welch (DVT)); S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced June 14, 2007, by Senator Max Baucus (D-MT)).
I have offered a detailed criticism of proposed Section 710, see Howard E. Abrams, A Close Look
at the Carried Interest Legislation, 117 TAX NOTES 961 (2007), and the American Bar
Association Section of Taxation has provided thoughtful comments on H.R. 2834, see AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION, COMMENTS ON H.R. 2834 (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy/2007/071113 commentshr2834.pdf.
85. H.R. 3970 § 710.
86. Technically, an "investment service partnership interest" is defined as a partnership
interest if the partner provides to the partnership any of the following services: (1) advice as to the
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling any "specified asset"; (2) managing, acquiring,
or disposing of any "specified asset"; or (3) arranging financing with respect to acquiring
"specified assets." H.R. 3970 § 710(c)(1). It also includes "ta]ny activity in support of any
service described in" (1) through (3). H.R. 3970 § 710(c)(l)(D). In this context, a "specified
asset" includes securities, commodities, and real estate. It also includes options and derivative
contracts with respect to such assets. H.R. 3970 § 710(c)(1) (final flush language).
87. Distributive share of net loss allocated to an "investment services partnership interest" is
limited to the extent of prior distributive shares of net income,, with any excess loss carried
This limitation is relaxed for the purchaser of an
forward. H.R. 3970 § 710(a)(2)(B).
"investment services partnership interest." H.R. 3970 § 710(a)(2)(D). Suspended losses do not
reduce the partner's outside basis. H.R. 3970 § 710(a)(2)(C).
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would convert distributive share from disposition of the real estate into
ordinary income from capital gain. However, even as to the rental
income, proposed Section 710 would have an impact because it
specifically provides that the net income allocated to the owner of an
"investment services partnership interest" is treated as compensation for
purposes of the Social Security and Medicare taxes under Section
1402(a).8 8
However, proposed Section 710 does not recharacterize as
compensation that portion of a partner's distributive share reasonably
allocated by the partnership to the "invested capital" of the partner
owning an "investment services partnership interest." 8 9 For this
purpose, an allocation will not be considered reasonable if it results in
an allocation of income to the "invested capital" of a partner providing
investment services in excess of the amount that is allocated to the same
amount of "invested capital" of any other partner not providing
investment services. 90 "Invested capital" includes the amount of cash
contributed by a partner as well as the fair market value of other
property contributed by the partner (measured as of the date of
contribution of the property). 9 1
"Invested capital" of a partner owning an "investment services
partnership interest" does not include any funds loaned by the partner to
the partnership (because it includes only the value of cash and property
"contributed" to the partnership).9 2 In addition, it does not include any
amount contributed by such a partner to the extent "attributable to the
proceeds of any loan or other advance made or guaranteed, directly or
indirectly, by any partner or [by] the partnership." 93 Application of this
rule does not turn on whether the loan is with or without recourse,
whether the owner of the "investment services partnership interest" is
credit-worthy, or to whom the creditor will look for repayment. 94 For
example, in the most extreme case, funds could be borrowed by a creditworthy service partner ("G") on a fully recourse basis and then
contributed to the partnership. But if the partnership's assets are
pledged to secure the loan, the loan will not count as "invested capital"
of G even though G is fully liable to the lender and even if the
partnership's assets eventually are used to repay some or all of the debt,
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See H.R. 3970 § 710(a)(I)(A).
H.R. 3970 § 710(c)(2)(A).
H.R. 3970 § 710(c)(2)(A).
H.R. 3970 § 710(c)(2)(C).
H.R. 3970 § 710(c)(2)(C).
H.R. 3970 § 710(c)(2)(D)(i).
H.R. 3970 § 710(c)(2)(D)(ii).
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G is fully liable to the partnership and to the other partners. Further, in
computing a "reasonable" allocation on the investment services
partner's "invested capital" as compared with the "invested capital" of
partners who have not contributed services to the venture, the loan made
or guaranteed by a non-service partner is treated as "invested capital" of
95
that non-service partner.
If appreciated property is distributed to a partner with respect to an
"investment services partnership interest," the property is treated as sold
by the partnership. 9 6 As a result, gain will be recognized to the
partnership and allocated among the partners in accordance with the
usual rules governing allocation of partnership income, with that portion
of the gain allocated to the owner of an "investment services partnership
interest" subject to recharacterization as compensation under proposed
Section 710(a) to the extent not attributable to the partner's "invested
capital. 9 7
The following section is divided into three parts. First, I explain why
Professors Gergen and Fleischer are misguided when they propose that
distributive share on carried interests should be treated as compensation
income independent of the activities of the partnership. Second, I
suggest how a more nuanced focus on the technical details of carried
interests should lead to a recharacterization of some distributions to
service partners. Third, I identify some of the many technical faults in
proposed Section 710, a provision which is so flawed that it should not
be enacted even if taxation of carried interests should be modified.

95. H.R. 3970 § 710(c)(2)(D)(ii).
96. H.R. 3970 § 710(b)(4).
97. The rules recharacterizing gain as compensation extend beyond "investment services
partnership interests" to certain "disqualified interests." H.R. 3970 § 710(d)(l). A "disqualified
interest" is any interest (other than nonconvertible and noncontingent debt) in any entity other
than stock in a domestic C corporation or a foreign corporation subject to a comprehensive
foreign income tax. H.R. 3970 § 710(d)(2). While a "disqualified interest" does not include a
partnership interest, H.R. 3970 § 710(d)(2)(A) (final flush language), it includes an option to
acquire a disqualified interest in an entity as well as derivative instruments entered into (directly
or indirectly) with an entity or with an investor in an entity. An interest in an entity will only be a
"disqualified interest" if the person holding the interest performs investment management
services for any entity and the value of the interest is "substantially related to the amount of
income or gain (whether or not realized) from the assets with respect to which the investment
management services are performed." H.R. 3970 § 710(d)(I).
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V. How SHOULD CARRIED

INTERESTS BE TAXED?

A. DistributiveShare on a CarriedInterest Properly Can Be Capital
Gain
The character of distributive share under current law is determined by
reference to the partnership's activities. 98 Thus, if the partnership earns
ordinary income, it passes through to the partners as ordinary income.
Conversely, if the partnership earns capital gain, it passes through to the
partners as capital gain. Professors Gergen and Fleischer have argued
that distributive share on a carried interest generally should be treated as
compensation income to the service partner. 99 Their proposals follow
from their assumption that all returns to labor should be treated as
compensation income, including the value (when received or as
profits received in
received over time) of an interest in partnership
10 0
connection with the performance of services.
While it is commonplace that income from labor cannot qualify as
capital gain, the statute does not actually say this. The closest it comes
is in its definitional sections, which limit capital gain to the "sale or
exchange of a capital asset" and provide that a "capital asset" is all
"property" with certain exceptions. 1 1 These definitions are read as
excluding returns to labor either for want of a "sale or exchange" or
because "property" does not include services. Neither reading, though,
is as strong as its advocates claim.
A "sale or exchange" requires, as a technical matter, that something
owned by one taxpayer be transferred to another.10 2 So, for example,
the cancellation of a share of stock or of a debt security is not a "sale or
exchange" because the underlying property is extinguished rather than
transferred. A second requirement of a "sale or exchange" is that the
transferor receive something in return for the transferred item. 10 3 Thus,
an abandonment of property is not a "sale or exchange" even though
ownership of the property moves from the abandoning taxpayer to
10 4
someone else.
98. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 4-5.
100. See supra notes 4-5.
101. I.R.C. § 1222(1)-(4) (2000).
102. See, e.g., Watson v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 463 (1932), cited with approval in
McClain v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 527, 529 n.5 (1941). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(d)

(1960) (definition of "exchange").
103. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1 (d).
104. E.g., Wolff v. Commissioner, 148 F.3d 186, 189-90 (2d Cir. 1998); Commissioner v.
Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344, 348 (2d Cir. 1958).
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Neither of these limitations necessarily excludes services from the
reach of capital gains. The transferee of services surely receives
something valuable that it did not have before, whether that something
is a haircut, improved plumbing, or a new heart valve. And since in all
these cases the transferor may be paid for the services rendered, it surely
seems as if a "sale or exchange" of services has occurred.
The "sale or exchange" limitation has been interpreted to exclude
carve-outs from the reach of the capital gain provisions. 10 5 So, for
example, renting property yields ordinary income rather than capital
gain because the owner of the property has not sold or exchanged the6
10
rented property but rather has sold only a limited, carved-out slice.
Similarly, the landlord who accepts payment for terminating a favorable
lease (unfavorable from the perspective of the tenant) recognizes
ordinary income because the landlord has retained rather than disposed
07
of the underlying property. 1
It is hard to characterize the sale of one's labor as the mere carve-out
from a larger property interest.10 8 To be sure, the laborer generally sells

only a portion of her labor and retains the greater share, but that by itself
does not resolve the matter: a taxpayer who sells only a part of a larger
piece of property is still entitled to capital gain treatment on the
transaction so long as what is sold can fairly be described as "property"
rather than as "income from property."' 1 9 It may be the case that labor
should not be described as "property," an argument discussed
immediately below, but if labor fairly can be so described, then selling

only a portion of one's labor (the effort of an hour or a day or a week,
105. See generally Kenneth F. Joyce & Louis A. Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA
Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests, 31
TAX L. REV. 121, 168-79 (1976); Louis A. Del Cotto, "Property" in the Capital Asset
Definition: Influence of "Fruit and Tree," 15 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 17-24 (1965); Charles S. Lyon &
James S. Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. Lake Case, 17
TAX L. REV. 295 (1962).
106. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
107. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). But see Metro. Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner,
282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960) (taxing a lease termination payment received by lessee as capital
gain because the lessee disposed of his entire interest in the underlying property). Compare Blair
v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 13 (1937) (transfer of an annual portion of a life estate treated as
transfer of property), with Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940) (annual transfer of
interest coupons from a bond treated as transfer of income).
108. But see Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 127 (1940) (transfer of future insurance
renewal commissions treated as transfer of income under Horst, 311 U.S. 112).
109. See, e.g., Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Baker v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 452 (2002); see generally Ronald H. Jensen, Can You Have Your Cake
and Eat It Too? Achieving Capital Gain Treatment While Keeping the Property, 5 Pi'Fr. L. REV.
75, 81-82 (2008).
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for example) cannot fairly be characterized as a temporary, carved-out
portion. "10
This brings us to the "property" limitation. It is too late in the day to
argue that the naked sale of one's labor generates capital gain."I ' But,
of course, the issue is not whether a carried interest is property under
current law but rather whether the statute should treat a partnership
interest received in connection with the performance of services as a
capital asset. And while it often is said that the term "property," when
used in the Internal Revenue Code, does not include services, that is
simply not true. To be sure, the term "property" sometimes does not
include unadorned services, but sometimes it does. Consider Section
1032, providing that a corporation does not recognize income upon the
transfer of shares in exchange for "property." 1 12 Since a corporation
has not engaged in profitable activity when exchanging its stock for
assets of any kind, it makes sense for this provision to include services
within the reach of "property," and the regulations properly reach that
11 3
conclusion.
As discussed above, there is a reasonable statutory argument that
Section 721 should have been interpreted to cover the contribution of
services to a partnership. But putting aside the technical requirements
of the Code for a moment, we should ask whether it makes sense for
returns to labor to be treated as capital gain under any circumstances.
As a starting point, it is clear that the capital gain/ordinary income
distinction is not equivalent to the difference between returns to capital
and returns to labor. Many returns to capital are taxed as ordinary
income, and many returns to labor are taxed as capital gain.
Interest and dividends are returns to capital that are taxed as ordinary
income. 114 While that result follows from the "sale or exchange"
language in the statute, we are at this point trying to determine what
Congress sought to capture when it defined capital gain, and regardless
of the mechanism of exclusion, it is clear the interest and dividends are
excluded from the definition of "capital gain. ' ' l 5 Gains from the
110. It long has been recognized that the "sale or exchange" limitation in the definition of
capital gain does a poor job of excluding from capital gain those returns which ought not qualify.
See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gain Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REV.

985, 988 n.7 (1956).
111. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2004-10, 2004-2 C.B. 960; Del Cotto, supra note 105, at 33.
112. I.R.C. § 1032 (2000).
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-1(a) (as amended in 2008).
114. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1946) (interest); Commissioner v. Stranahan,
472 F.2d 867, 869 (6th Cir. 1973) (dividends).
115. Hort, 313 U.S. at 31; Stranahan,472 F.2d at 869.
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disposition of inventory also are excluded (though not for want of a sale
or exchange),' 16 as are amounts received for a letter if received by the
writer of the letter or by the intended recipient.117 Conversely, amounts
received for the sale of letters patent are treated as capital gain even if
received by the inventor. 1 18 Surely capital assets cannot plausibly be
described as returns to capital nor can exclusions be described as returns
to labor.
If a taxpayer purchases and improves a capital asset (by painting,
plumbing, or roofing, for example), sale or exchange of the improved
property qualifies as capital gain even though some or all of the gain is
allocable to the owner's labor.1 19 A taxpayer who forms a corporation
enjoys capital gains on the sale or exchange of the shares even if the
increase in value of the shares is attributable to the taxpayer's efforts or
business savvy.
Indeed, a taxpayer who actively, regularly, and
continuously trades securities reports the gains and losses as capital
even though those gains and losses derive from the taxpayer's acumen
12 0
(or lack thereof) in making the trades.
Those who say that returns to labor cannot qualify as capital gain
recognize these exceptions but treat them as anomalies. 12 1 That is one
way to view the matter, but there are alternatives. There is an anecdote
that mathematicians tell about physicists:
The physicist hypothesized that all odd numbers greater than one are
prime. To test this hypothesis, the physicist started with three and
counted upward by twos, finding that five and seven and eleven and
thirteen all were prime numbers, as predicted. The number nine, of
course, was not prime, which presented a theoretical difficulty. So the
physicist decided that nine was an experimental error and declared the
theory proven.
Those who say that the capital gain/ordinary income distinction
draws a sharp line between returns to capital and returns to labor treat
these exceptions as anomalies, but perhaps they are not so anomalous if
the line is drawn differently. We know that capital gain does not
include inventory gain, wages and other usual forms of compensation,
interest on debt, dividends on equity, or rental income. But it does
116. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) (2000 & West Supp. 2008).
117. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3)(A), (B) (2000 & West Supp. 2008).
118. I.R.C. § 1235 (2000).
119. See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, The Carried Interest Controversy:
Let's Not Get Carried Away, 61 TAx L. REv. 121, 133 (2008).
120. Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 199-201 (1963); Higgins v. Commissioner,
312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941).
121. Surrey, supra note 110, at 1002-03; see also Fleischer, supra note 4, at 43-44;
Pendergraft, supra note 5, at 711.
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include gain from the sale of stock despite the level of energy put into
running the corporation or selecting the stocks. Is there a unifying
theme? What is the touchstone of capital gain? 122 Over the years,
23
many explanations have been offered for the capital gain preference

(and for the limitation imposed on capital loss), such as a bunching
problem,

amelioration

of the

corporate

double

tax,

a general

disinclination to tax returns to capital, and a proxy for an inflation
adjustment. But none of these justifications for the capital gain
preference holds up; 124 indeed, I think it fair to say that the consensus
today is that the capital gain preference is best supported by a non-tax
solution to the lock-in
policy argument coupled with a second-best
12 5
problem caused by the realization doctrine.

First, the non-tax policy argument: the capital gain preference
reduces the tax rate on returns to entrepreneurial risk to encourage risktaking. 126 From this perspective, it should reward only residual returns
on investment, thereby excluding both periodic returns such as interest,
rents, and dividends, as well as most compensation and any other
income not dependent on the long-term success of the underlying
122. At least one commentator has asserted that the original justification for the capital gain
preference was that recognition of accrued gain in a single year would unjustifiably push a
taxpayer into a higher bracket. William A. Friedlander, "To Customer": The Forgotten Element
in the Characterizationof Gains on Sales of Real Property, 39 TAX L. REV. 31, 31 (1983).
123. See the seminal work on the capital gain preference, Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary
of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247, 248-66 (1957) (discussing the arguments for
preferential treatment of capital gains and the arguments for taxing capital gains in full).
124. The solution to the bunching problem is income averaging; reducing the rate of tax on
capital gain provides a benefit even to taxpayers who perennially are in the highest tax bracket
and so face no bunching problem. See Del Cotto, supra note 105, at 4 (discussing the meaning of
"Property" in the Capital Assets definition). Because the capital gain preference applies to more
than corporate stock, it cannot be justified as an amelioration of the corporate double tax.
Accounting for inflation requires a proportional basis adjustment rather than a reduction in the
rate applicable to taxable gain, a basis adjustment which should also be incorporated into the
taxation of debt obligations to adjust both principle and interest computations. See Mitchell L.
Engler, PartialBasis Indexation: Tax Arbitrage and Related Issues, 55 TAX L. REV. 69 (2001)
(arguing that partial indexation of assets, but not debt, is a better response to lock-in than the
capital gains preference).
125. See Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains
Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319 (1993) (examining the capital gains preference); Del Cotto,
supra note 105, at 4-5; Posting of Daniel Shaviro to Start Making Sense,
http://danshaviro.blogspot.com2007/05/tax-break-for-managers-of-private.html (May 15, 2007,
12:09 EST); Blum, supra note 123, at 266 ("Of the arguments against taxing capital gains in full,
Full taxation of gains would tend to retard investment by
only a few carry much weight ....
enterprises, discourage risk-taking, and interfere with the mobility of capital.").
126. As long ago as 1941, the Supreme Court recognized that "[tihe taxation of capital gains
after deduction of capital losses on a more favorable basis than other income, was provided for
• . . as the means of encouraging profit-taking sales of capital investments." Helvering v.
Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 509 (1941) (citing H.R. REP. No. 67-350, at 8 (1921)).
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venture. 12 7 Conversely, the capital gain preference should benefit
owners to the extent they profit after accounting for operating costs
(including labor and capital) of their business.
Nonentrepreneurial return includes all business income not dependent
on the success of the venture. So, for example, it includes interest
payments received by creditors because they get paid even if the
borrower loses money. And it includes my salary from Emory Law
School because I get paid even if the school is unable to fill its class.
Indeed, almost all compensation lacks entrepreneurial risk and so should
be classified as ordinary income.
Even most performance-based
compensation generally lacks entrepreneurial risk because it generally is
payable even if only short-term goals are reached, and the owners of the
business must, out of necessity, care about the long-term success of the
venture. 12 8 This is an important distinction and one to which we will
return.
The capital gain preference also responds to the economic
disincentives created by the realization doctrine.
Because the
realization doctrine defers taxation on unrealized appreciation so long
(but only so long) as an appreciated asset remains unsold, the realization
doctrine discourages the free movement of capital. This lock-in effect is
exacerbated by the step-up in basis given to property held by a taxpayer
until death. 129 Of course, if the realization doctrine were eliminated
either directly or indirectly, 130 this problem would disappear. But the
administrative difficulties created by such a direct attack on the
127. See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 110, at 990 (noting that the capital gain definition seeks to
exclude "everyday profits of the business and commercial world"); id. at 1001 (stating that
"salaries, wages, commissions, and professional fees are on the ordinary income side, along with
the everyday profits of the businessman").
128. This point recently was made by one of the business columnists for the New York Times,
albeit not in the context of carried interests. In her column of June 8, 2008, Gretchen Morgenson
proposed that corporate executives who receive performance-based compensation be required to
repay such compensation if the corporation is required to restate past earnings on which such
compensation was based; this is especially true when the restatement is based on actions of the
executives. She further advocates that executives be required to repay performance-based
compensation when they "take outsized risks to generate fatter pay packages." Her argument is
based on the disconnect between the need for shareholders to be concerned with long-term
growth as compared with executive compensation triggered by short-term results; in effect, Ms.
Morgenson argues that the existing compensation structure is essentially nonentreprenurial, and
she calls for that to be changed. Gretchen Morgenson, Pay It Back If You Didn't Earn It, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2008, Business Section at 1-2.
129. See, e.g., Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 125, at 344-45.
130. The realization doctrine would be eliminated directly by requiring taxpayers to mark all
assets to market; it would be eliminated indirectly by allowing recognition of gain to wait until
disposition (as under current law) but with an imposition of an interest charge to account for the
deferral.
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realization doctrine have dissuaded Congress from making the attempt;
as a second best alternative, Congress has reduced the lock-in effect by
reducing the tax burden on most recognized gains.
This suggests that income ought to be excluded from the capital gain
preference if the taxpayer cannot easily control the timing of its
recognition. Such a limitation supports the exclusion from the capital
gain preference of day-to-day profits of a business as well as inventory
gains' 3' and most compensation. But note that this reasoning is fully
consistent with current law applicable to the taxation of partners, even
partners who receive their interests in connection with the performance
of services, because the timing of the income includible by such
partners is determined by the activities of the partnership. Thus, if
distributive share will be characterized as ordinary income on the sale
by the partnership of capital assets, the partners will have an incentive
to defer such sales. This is precisely the lock-in effect to which the
capital gain preference was intended to speak.
It may seem as if Section 83 is inconsistent with this interpretation of
the capital gain preference, but in fact it is not. Under Section 83(a),
recognition of compensatory property transfers are deferred until
ownership of the property vests in the transferee, where vesting
generally means that the property is not subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture. 132 At least in the context of restricted stock, such vesting
usually occurs after a fixed period of time or when certain corporate
earning goals are reached. In such cases, timing of the recognition is
not within control of the service-providing shareholder, and therefore,
recognition as ordinary income is appropriate.
What makes the application of Section 83 to partnership interests
fundamentally different from its application to corporate stock is the
pass-thru taxation of partnership earnings. A controlling shareholder
has no reason to cause the corporation to defer sale of its capital assets
to exploit deferral under Section 83 because recognition of corporatelevel gains does not affect shareholder-level taxation. But a controlling
partner facing recharacterization of partnership-level capital gain into
compensation income has good reason to defer the entity-level sale, and
it is for this reason that application of Section 83 to profits interests is
fundamentally inconsistent with the capital gain preference viewed as
an ameliorating influence on the lock-in problem.

131. See Friedlander, supra note 122, at 34-35 (discussing the meaning and function of term
"to customers").
132. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(b) (as amended in 2005).
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B. Entrepreneurialand NonentrepreneurialCarriedInterests
As described above, one rationale underlying the capital gain
preference is that it should reward only entrepreneurial returns. Not all
For
distributive share fairly can be described as entrepreneurial.
example, gross income allocations made to a service partner are best
characterized as compensation, and the law now characterizes such
allocations in that way. 133 Under Section 707(a)(1), "[i]f a partner
engages in a transaction with a partnership other than in his capacity as
a member of such partnership, the transaction shall.., be considered as
1 34
occurring between the partnership and one who is not a partner."'
Further, Section 707(a)(2)(A) provides that:
If (i) a partner performs services for a partnership . . . (ii) there is a
related direct or indirect allocation and distribution to such partner,
and the performance of such service . . . and (iii) the allocation and
distribution, when viewed together, are properly characterized as a
transaction occurring between the partnership and a partner acting
other than in his capacity as a member of the partnership, such
allocation and distribution
shall be treated as a transaction described in
13 5
707(a)(1)].
[Section
This rule should capture not only gross income allocations (as are
captured under current law) but also annual net income allocations that
will not be offset by subsequent allocations of loss even if the
partnership suffers losses in the future. 136 That is, allocation on a
carried interest, followed by the distribution of the allocated amount, to
the extent not subject to a potential claw-back allocation does not reflect
an entrepreneurial return because it is independent of the overall success
of the venture. Such allocations and distributions, therefore, should be
"properly characterized as a transaction occurring between the
partnership and a partner acting other than in his capacity as a member
of the partnership." 13 7 Indeed, while no regulations have been
promulgated with respect to the service transfer component of Section
707(a)(2)(A), regulations under the corresponding property transfer
component in Section 707(a)(2)(B) provide that the touchstone of

133. Technically it is not the gross income allocation itself but rather the associated
distribution that is recharacterized under Section 707(a) as compensation.
134. I.R.C. § 707(a)(1) (2000).

135. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(A) (2000).
136. Lee Sheppard also has suggested that carried interest taxation can be handled adequately

under Section 707(a)(2)(A). See Sheppard, supra note 5, at 19-21.
137. I.R.C. § 707(b)(1) (2000).
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a
recharacterization under Section 707(a)(2) is the extent to which
13 8
distribution is subject to the entrepreneurial risks of the venture.
When an allocation and distribution are recharacterized as
compensation under Section 707(a)(2), the partnership-level capital gain
is not eliminated. Rather, it is allocated among the partners, who are
then treated as paying compensation to the service partner. To the
extent such payments constitute ordinary and necessary business
expenses, an offsetting deduction will arise. 139 In many cases, all
partners will be in the same marginal tax bracket, and so the effect of
recharacterization will be to shift income among the partners but will
not change the net income they report in the aggregate. If, however,
some of the partners are exempt organizations or foreign taxpayers not
generally subject to U.S. taxation, recharacterization will have
significant fiscal impact.
The virtues of this approach are many. First, it does not create any
new complexity in the Internal Revenue Code: Section 707(a)(2)(A) is
already there. Second, it does not eliminate capital gain: when a
partnership sells a capital asset, the gain is includible without
recharacterization. Third, it is consistent with the premise underlying
the capital gain preference: entrepreneurial returns alone will qualify for
reduced taxation and income arising in connection with the performance
of services but not dependent on success of the venture will be taxed as
ordinary income. Fourth, when all of the relevant parties are highbracket U.S. taxpayers, it does not have the result of turning the
payment of compensation for ordinary and necessary business expenses
into a net income producing event, a result that is inconsistent with the
tax base as consisting of accessions to wealth: payment of compensation
for ordinary and necessary business expenses moves funds around but
produces nothing of value (that is, in fact, precisely what separates
payment of an ordinary and necessary business expense from a capital
expenditure).
C. Technical Flaws in the Legislative Reform Proposals
There are many technical flaws in the proposed legislation adding
Section 710 to the Internal Revenue Code, and there is no need to
recount all of them here. 140 But it is worthwhile, I think, to identify the
138. See Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(2) (as amended in 1992).
139. I.R.C. § 162 (2000 & West. 2008).
140. See Close Look, supra note 5, at 962-71 (discussing the ambiguities and the
implementation difficulties of Section 710); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF
TAXATION, supra note 84 (providing commentary on H.R. 2834); Schler, supra note 5, at 832-53

(discussing the specific and technical issues of Section 710).
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most important conceptual failure in the proposed statute because it
makes clear just how difficult it is to recharacterize distributive share on
a carried interest as ordinary income without regard to the partnership's
14 1
activities.
While proposed Section 710 excludes from its reach reasonable
allocations made with respect to a partner's "invested capital," a ceiling
is placed on this allowable reasonable allocation:
An allocation will not be treated as reasonable for purposes of this
subparagraph if such allocation would result in the partnership
allocating a greater portion of income to invested capital than any
other partner not providing services would have
been allocated with
42
respect to the same amount of invested capital. 1
The term "invested capital" means the fair market value at the time of
contribution of any money or other property contributed to the
14 3
partnership.
These rules can be easily understood in the context of a simple
example. Suppose X contributes cash of $96 to a partnership while Y
contributes cash of $4 as well as services in exchange for an interest that
falls within the definition of an "investment services partnership
interest." An allocation to Y will not be subject to the rules of proposed
Section 710 to the extent that the partnership expressly makes an
allocation attributable to Y's contributed capital and that allocation does
144
not exceed 4% of the partnership's net income.
If, in the next taxable year, Y contributes additional cash of $20 to
the venture, then the maximum reasonable allocation of net partnership
income that can be allocated to Y without recharacterization under
proposed Section 710 increases to 20% (24 of 120 equals 20%). Such a
result makes sense because, had Y contributed $24 initially, Y could
have been allocated as much as 20% of the venture's net income as a
return to Y's contributed capital. There is no reason why the same
result should not be reached if the capital is contributed in a subsequent
year, and the language of proposed Section 710 plainly reaches this
145
proper result.
141. This discussion is excerpted from Close Look, supra note 5, at 962, 970-71.
142. Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 710(c)(2)(A)(ii)

(2007).
143. H.R. 3970 § 710(c)(2)(C).
144. This example assumes that all capital shares equally in distributions. If there are multiple
classes of capital, the analysis becomes more complicated.
145. The general rule recharacterizing distributive share as compensation explicitly is applied
on a year-by-year basis, see H.R. 3970 § 710(a)(I)(A)-(B), while the definition of "invested
capital" includes the value of all contributions (valued at the time of contribution), H.R. 3970 §

710(c)(2)(C).
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But what if, rather than Y contributing additional cash in a
subsequent year, the partnership instead returns some of X's capital to
X? Suppose, for example, that the partnership ultimately determines
that it requires less capital than originally anticipated and so in year 2
distributes cash of $20 to X. Once that distribution is made, Y's
proportionate share of the contributed capital increases from 4% to
5%.146 But proposed Section 710 makes no allowance for adjusting the
definition of a "reasonable" allocation on capital for distributions even
if this distribution increases Y's claim on all future distributions.
This omission in the context of carried interests is particularly
important because many carried interests receive distributions only after
capital is returned to the investing partners. As a result, the relative
capital contributed by the general partner may increase year by year.
But by ignoring such distributions, proposed Section 710 blinds itself to
the changing economic relationship of the parties.
A similar significant omission in the definition of a "reasonable"
allowance for distributive share attributable to contributed capital is the
failure of Section 710 to account for undistributed distributive (i.e.,
allocated) share. For example, again assume that X contributes cash of
$96 while Y contributes cash of $4, and assume that Y's interest in the
venture falls within the definition of an "investment services partnership
interest." Assume further that under the partnership agreement, net
profit from the venture will be allocated 80% to X and 20% to Y. On
these facts, and assuming the partnership has a single class of capital,
the maximum reasonable allocation on Y's capital equals 4%, and if the
partnership makes such a specification, the remainder (16%) of the
allocation to Y will be captured by proposed Section 710.
Assume the partnership earns a taxable profit of $50 in year 1, and
that this income is allocated 80% (that is, $40) to X and 20% (that is,
$10) to Y. Under the analysis presented above, of the $10 allocated to
Y, $2 will be treated as attributable to Y's capital and $8 will treated as
compensation to Y. If the partnership retains its $50 profit, it now has
aggregate capital of $150, of which $100 was contributed and $50 was
earned.
What is the maximum reasonable allocation that can be made to Y,
attributable to Y's capital in the next taxable year? While Y's
contributed capital remains at $4, Y's share of the venture's aggregate
capital now equals $14, and that is almost 10% of the venture's
aggregate capital ($14 of $150). That is, as the partnership allocates
146. Following the distribution, X's contributed capital equals $76 while Y's remains at $4,
and $4 out of $80 equals 5%.
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profit to Y in excess of Y's relative share of contributed capital, Y's
share of the aggregate capital increases. To be sure, if the earned profit
is distributed in the same proportion that it is allocated (that is $40 to X
and $10 to Y), there will be no change in shares of aggregate capital.
But to the extent such amounts remain undistributed, the maximum
allowable allocation on Y's capital should increase to reflect the prior
taxable inclusion by Y. Indeed, by distributing the venture's profits to
the partners, followed by a recontribution of those profits, the partners
can arrive at precisely this result. But surely there is no reason to force
such a circular transfer of cash simply to arrive at what should be the
correct statutory result.
Most holders of carried interests not only do not receive distributions
equal to allocations, but in fact the investing partners generally receive
distributions in excess of allocations; that is, carried interests share in
allocations from the start but receive distributions only after capital has
been returned to the limited partners. 147 As a result, the relative share
of partnership capital properly allocable to the carried interest
simultaneously increases because (1) the owner of the carried interest
sees his distributive share accumulated rather than distributed and (2)
the other partners receive distributions not only of distributive share but
also as a return of capital. Thus, in many partnerships, the relative share
of invested capital (including both contributed capital and retained
profits) dramatically shifts toward the holder of the carried interest.
Finally, in many partnerships, the return to the general partner is
subordinated to a specified return (usually called a "hurdle") on the
capital of the limited partners. As a result, in many taxable years, the
distributive share of the general partner may be far less than the
allowable "reasonable" maximum if that amount is determined based on
a pro rata comparison of "invested capital." Such partnerships often
authorize so-called "catch up" allocations in years of significant profit,
which ensure that the general partner's aggregate return is not
prejudiced by an uneven earning stream of the venture.
For example, suppose a general partner holding an "investment
services partnership interest" contributes 2% of the capital to a
partnership. Suppose further that in the first three years of the venture,
the partner's net income is allocated exclusively to the limited partners.
Finally, assume that in the fourth year of the venture, the partnership's
income is substantial and the partnership allocates 2% of the venture's
aggregate net income to the general partner, an amount that equals, say,
5% of the partnership's income for the current taxable year. Under
147.

See generally Abrams, supra note 34.
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proposed Section 710 as written, the catch-up 5% allocation may be
recharacterized as compensation to the extent of 3% out of the 5% of
that allocation. 14 8 But, of course, the entire 5% is nothing but a return
on capital, albeit delayed. That is, if an amount could be allocated to
the owner of "an investment services partnership interest" over multiple
years without recharacterization under proposed Section 710, then the
same amount should be permitted without recharacterization if allocated
in one or more subsequent years. As this and the examples above show,
in a complex partnership, it can be frighteningly difficult to define what
is a carried interest and what is not.
VI. WHY NOTHING WAS DONE (AND WHY NOTHING WAS THE RIGHT
THING TO

Do)

There are, it seems, three possible explanations for the failure of
carried interest reform to have succeeded. First, it could be that private
equity outfoxed reform-minded academics. Professor Fleischer framed
the carried interest issue largely in class-warfare terms, with private
equity and hedge managers as the bad guys. Somehow, by the time
legislative reform was proposed, the change captured real estate
partnerships as well. But the arguments in favor of reform fit less
comfortably on such a broad class of partners, many of whom are not
wealthy and almost all of whom vote. Had the legislation targeted only
private equity and hedge funds, it is hard to see how it could have failed.
A second explanation is that Congress did not want it to succeed in
the first place. As Professor Fred McChesney first recognized more
than twenty years ago, 14 9 legislators who seek to maximize the value of
their legislative activity for themselves can threaten insular groups with
disadvantageous reform and then collect economic rents in exchange for
not passing the legislation. While cynical in its view of the legislative
process, it does no more than treat politicians as individual actors who
have their own goals and work to accomplish their desired ends.
A third explanation is that the proposed reform of carried interest
taxation was a bad idea badly executed, and sometimes bad laws fail
simply because they should. It is a naive view, to be sure, but I like to
think that is has explanatory power. Of course, there is revenue to be
raised, and private equity is a deep and politically expedient pocket. For
148. H.R. 3970 § 710(c)(2)(A) (2007).
149. See generally Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic
Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987) (examining politicians' role in rent
extraction and rent creation); see also Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-Group
Organizationin a Coasean Model of Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1991) (discussing the
different models of redistribution within the economic theory of regulation).
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carried interest reform to fail, it must be defeated every time it is
proposed; for it to succeed, it must succeed only once. Carried interest
reform was proposed in June as a way to pay for the extenders bill, and
while it was defeated in that context, 150 it surely will be introduced
again after the November elections. Carried interest reform seems
inevitable. Unwise, but inevitable.

150. The extenders were added to the recently enacted bailout legislation shortly before
passage. See Emergency Economic Stablization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343 (Div. C)
(2008).

